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Regulating Managed Care Coverage: A New
Direction For Health-Planning Agencies*
Thaddeus J. Nodzenski**
If managed care has its anticipated effect of reducing real or
perceived excess capacity in the health care delivery system, the
current capital-focused orientation of health-planning agencies,
which regulate capital expansion in the health care industry, will
become anachronistic.' Health-planning agencies should antici-
pate certificate of need ("CON") applications to drop as man-
aged care penetration and other cost-containing pressures being
exerted on health care providers increase. In states such as
California and Minnesota, where managed care market penetra-
tion and influence are substantial, the "downsizing" of the medi-
cal industrial complex proceeds without the aid of health-
planning regulation. For example, in California, where in 1994
approximately forty percent of the population was covered by
health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"),3 the inpatient
days per thousand population figure in 1996 was 518.8 as com-
* The thoughts, ideas, and positions expressed herein do not represent the policy
of the Illinois Hospital & HealthSystems Association and are solely those of the
author.
** Mr. Nodzenski is associate general counsel for the Illinois Hospital & Health-
Systems Association and an adjunct professor teaching health care law at Northwest-
ern University School of Law. He received his Bachelor of Arts from the University
of Chicago, his Juris Doctor from IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, and his Master of
Laws from Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See J. Duncan Moore, Jr., CON Survival Struggle, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Aug.
11, 1997, at 32 (Certificate of need ("CON"), the "state regulatory tool, invented in
the 1970s to try to rein in galloping health care expenditures, has fallen largely out of
favor in this market-driven age. In many states it has withered on the vine; in 13 it has
been abolished outright."). The following states have repealed their CON programs
since 1983: Ohio in 1995; South Dakota in 1988; California and Colorado in 1987;
Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, Texas, and Wyoming in 1985; Minnesota and Utah in
1984; and Idaho in 1983. See Thom Wilder, Ohio Law Highlights Sweeping Changes
for State CON Programs, 4 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 829, 829 (June 1, 1995). Louisiana
also never enacted a CON program. See id.
2. See Moore, supra note 1, at 32 (according to Thomas R. Piper, the Executive
Director of Missouri's CON program, "[one current leading argument is that market-
driven managed care, with its emphasis on lower utilization, will supplant the regula-
tory apparatus. The more you have of one, the less you need of the other.").
3. See HEALTH CARE STATE RANKINGS 1997 251 (Kathleen O'Leary Morgan &
Scott Morgan eds., 5th ed. 1997).
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pared with 738.1 days per thousand in Illinois, which had a rela-
tively modest HMO market penetration of only twenty percent
that year.4 Although capital improvements and changes in serv-
ices of hospitals and other providers will always play some role
in our health care delivery system, the diminishing volume of
work for health-planners in these areas raises the question of
whether they have a role to play in a managed care world, and if
so, what role they should play.
As the health care system changes in response to the effi-
ciency impulses of managed care, health-planners should refocus
their expertise and efforts on how managed care and its regula-
tion affect the delivery of health care. These agencies have fo-
cused for decades on whether certain proposed capital or service
projects were "needed" under various and usually complex for-
mulas and criteria.5 The agencies came into being as part of a
broader cost-containment agenda in the 1970s. As payors and
purchasers of health care pursued their own cost-containing ini-
tiatives which led to the birth and growth of managed care op-
tions (e.g., HMOs, preferred provider organizations, point of
service plans), the growth of health care facilities has slowed,
and in some areas hospitals have been forced to close.
The need for health-planning, however, has not gone away.
Today, the overarching health care regulatory concern is man-
aged care. The promise of the most aggressive forms of man-
aged care is that wasteful health care costs will be contained by
placing providers at financial risk through capitation payments,
and that outcomes will be as good as or better than fee-for-ser-
vice outcomes through greater accountability and standardiza-
tion of medical care. Managed care's price competition for
provider services is designed, in part, to squeeze out the excess
service and capital capacity in the health care system. Whether
its cost-cutting efforts cut too deeply has triggered the call for
mandated health care coverage.
As a result, we are witnessing the introduction of so-called
"patient protection" legislation throughout the United States.
Congress has already enacted a prohibition against "drive-
through deliveries"' 6 and is now considering similar legislation
4. See HOSPITAL STATISTICS 55, 73 (American Hospital Association ed., 1998).
5. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 1100 (1991).
6. The term "drive-through deliveries" refers to the practice of discharging new
mothers and their babies within twenty-four hours of childbirth. See Senate Panel
Approves Federal Standards for Maternity Coverage, 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 630
(Apr. 25, 1996). At least twenty-six states have enacted mandatory maternity length-
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regarding "drive-through mastectomies. '' 7 In 1997, the Illinois
legislature considered no fewer than sixteen bills covering nine
mandated health care benefits, ranging from minimum lengths
of stay to investigational cancer treatment.
The participants in our health care delivery system-payors,
patients and providers-have always struggled with the conflict-
ing goals of satisfying individual health objectives and serving
some greater common good. The tension between these individ-
ual and group interests has engaged our country in a dramatic
and intense discussion about how we balance the cost-quality
trade-offs in health care. But how should policy makers assess
mandated health care proposals? Should the focus be on pa-
tients as individuals with idiosyncratic health care needs and
desires or as "statistical lives" within a group insurance plan?
How can the system reconcile the conflicting goals of individuals
as patients, who seek maximum care, and as premium payers,
who seek the lowest premium?
Given our history of aggressively attacking illness and infir-
mity with an open checkbook to pay for seemingly unlimited
health care coverage, 8 the bias of legislators seems to be unsym-
pathetic to the managed care message and approach. Managed
care's standardized, statistical approach to health care is virtu-
ally ignored in the current legislative environment because of
the political difficulty in denying an individual's unique need or
desire for certain treatment. 9
This problem is greatly exacerbated when an individual situa-
tion, such as a "drive-through delivery," results in a bad out-
come that is publicized across the nation by the news media and
repeated enough to turn the matter into a national crisis. 10
While the empirical data on length of stay for newborns and
their mothers did not seem to support the legislative response,"
of-stay legislation. See New Round of 'Anti-Managed Care' Bills Await State Action,
Blues Survey Finds, 5 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 290 (Feb. 12, 1997).
7. See Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1986 (1996). The term
"drive-through mastectomies" is used to describe the practice of discharging women
shortly after having undergone a mastectomy, lumpectomy, or lymph node dissection.
See id.
8. See LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE AND CULTURE 124 (1988).
9. See Terese Hudson, Quick Fixes?, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Sept. 20, 1995,
at 36; Anthony Man, Drive-Through Deliveries-An Early Skirmish in the Battle
Over Managed Health Care, ILLINOIS ISSUES, May 1996, at 27, 27-28.
10. See Hudson, supra note 9, at 36.
11. See Julie A. Gazamararian & Jeffrey P. Koplan, Length-of-Stay After Delivery:
Managed Care Versus Fee-For-Service, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Winter 1996, at 74; see also
1998]
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opponents of such legislation could do little to stop it. This
"drive-through delivery" example provides a model for illustrat-
ing how supporters of mandated health care benefits need to
proceed under current conditions to get their mandate enacted.
An individual horror story is worth hundreds of empirical stud-
ies when it comes to health care issues in legislative bodies.12
Individual claims will typically triumph over more generalized
claims based upon the greater good of the group.
Even when managed care's voice is heard in the current polit-
ical processes across the country, the message is usually built
upon demonizing the opposing side, with little concern for the
actual costs and benefits of the proposed mandate. 13 This envi-
ronment is not conducive to making sound decisions about
health care mandates. Indeed, as of October 1996, all state leg-
islation regulating managed care had been enacted without con-
sidering evidence of its impact on the cost and quality of care. 4
Developing a health-planning process to evaluate proposed
managed care mandates given the inherent tension between
serving the greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarian-
ism), as evidenced by the appeal of managed care, and treating
all individuals with equal dignity and respect (egalitarianism), as
evidenced by our desire to meet individual health care needs, is
the focus of this Article. It begins with a brief description of the
utilitarian-egalitarian conflict that plays out in a managed care
coverage debate. In developing the factors that ought to be con-
sidered in making more informed judgments about such propos-
als, this Article explores the philosophical tension between the
utilitarianism of managed care and the egalitarianism of individ-
ual patients making claims for specific health care benefits. 15
Stripped of emotional rhetoric, the managed care coverage
debate results in a stalemate between utilitarianism and egalitar-
ianism. Despite efforts by scholars such as Norman Daniels, no
one has developed an incontestable and distributively just
George J. Annas, Women and Children First, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1647 (1995);
Fred J. Helinger, The Expanding Scope of State Legislation, 276 JAMA 1065, 1069
(1996); Hudson, supra note 9, at 36; Man, supra note 9, at 27-28.
12. See Hudson, supra note 9, at 36.
13. See GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH 218 (1996).
14. See Helinger, supra note 11, at 1069.
15. The philosophical positions ascribed to patients and managed care in this Arti-
cle are artificial in that no one is ever a utilitarian or an egalitarian all of the time.
Managed care companies may certainly make individualized exceptions to their gen-
eral coverage rules, and individual patients may forgo life-sustaining treatment to
avoid bankrupting their estates.
[Vol. 7
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scheme for allocating health care. Consequently, we are left try-
ing to accommodate competing, divergent, and, at times, oppos-
ing views about such issues. From these philosophical extremes,
however, one begins to see what factors merit consideration by
policy makers assessing proposed minimum health care benefits.
The public policy challenge is to devise a process for rationing
managed care services that best allows for these opposing views
to be heard and accommodated. If there is an ethical right to
health care, it "cannot mean a right to every benefit that health
care can provide, but rather only a right to a reasonable package
of benefits that can be afforded without great sacrifice by society
as a whole. 16
The second part of this Article describes the mission and func-
tion of a health care mandate assessment commission that offers
a promising method to assess individual need, technology, the
state of the economy, public preferences and expectations, and
political realities in the provision of health care. Because the
market may fail to allocate health care benefits in a socially de-
sirable way, it is important to have some regulatory check on the
abuses, excesses, or failures of the free market system in health
care.
Current state health-planning agencies are ideal candidates
for assuming the responsibility of monitoring whether the free
market for health care coverage sufficiently addresses the allo-
cation of health care resources. A health-planning commission
supported by appropriate public input and guided by proper as-
sessment guidelines is likely to offer a more thorough analysis of
mandated benefit proposals than is taking place in the present
legislative arena. The hope, of course, is that a better-informed
legislature, armed with the findings and recommendations of an
independent health-planning commission, will be more likely to
enact sound health care mandate legislation than the current
system yields on a piecemeal basis. Although politics will al-
ways play some role in the commission's assessment of proposed
mandates, this approach would help mute or dissipate its impact
and give reason and reflection a better chance of guiding
legislators.
16. CHARLES J. DOUGHERTY, BACK TO REFORM 44-45 (1996).
1998]
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I. THE MANAGED CARE LANDSCAPE
Before delving more deeply into the utilitarian and egalitarian
perspectives regarding the distribution of health care, it is im-
portant to highlight what may be overlooked in this debate.
What is fundamentally at stake is not just the provision of health
care. This conflict is really about how health care is financed. It
is a debate about money, what sort of health care it should
purchase, and on what terms. The question of how health care
is financed has significant ethical implications.
Managed care is primarily a cost-containment strategy that
hinges upon the elimination of unnecessary health care. It cre-
ates an environment for cost savings in two ways. First, and
foremost, managed care places health care providers at financial
risk for "over-treating" patients. 17 Managed care's most aggres-
sive cost-containment arrangement with physicians typically in-
volves some sort of capitation payment and withhold or bonus
arrangement to induce physicians to be more discriminating
consumers of health care resources.'8 A capitated physician,
who only gets $100 per patient per month from an HMO, is
loath to spend more than $100 per month treating a particular
patient. Contrary to the traditional fee-for-service model, in
which physicians are paid more for doing more, physicians
under managed care fare better (financially) by providing less.
The fundamental belief of managed care is that patients will
do as well as, if not better than, fee-for-service patients as they
receive less care. When faced with medical uncertainty, man-
aged care's default principle is to forgo unproven medical inter-
vention. As long as the efficacy of most medical intervention
remains unproved, managed care has ample opportunity to
"manage" care by denying it. Sick patients generally take the
opposite view: When in doubt, treat.19 So far, managed care's
gamble that patients will do as well as they would do under a
fee-for-service system seems to be paying off. Current outcome
research, admittedly preliminary and undoubtably flawed, sug-
gests that managed care may not be placing patients at greater
17. See Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604-
07 (1995).
18. Capitated physicians are paid a fixed amount, regardless of the number of
patients seen or the amount of services performed. Bonus payments reward physi-
cians who limit referrals to specialists while withhold payments allow a portion of the
physicians' salary to be withheld to pay for ancillary services. If residual funds re-
main, they are returned to the physicians.
19. See PAYER, supra note 8, at 124.
[Vol. 7
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risk because of undertreatment. 21 The relative absence of medi-
cal malpractice cases against managed care organizations for un-
dertreatment also encourages the trend toward cutting down on
health care intervention.
It is still too early to tell whether the absence of proven
poorer outcomes for managed care patients is due to the validity
of the health care minimalist bias or whether managed care has
simply attracted a healthier enrollment population that does not
need or seek intensive treatments and therapies. The strongest
evidence against managed care's "just say no" approach would
be outcome data suggesting that managed care has either suc-
ceeded at "cream skimming" the healthiest enrollees into its
managed care plans or that managed care jeopardizes patient
welfare through undertreatment. Ironically, however, organized
medicine has historically resisted the very sort of outcome re-
search that it needs to test the assumptions of managed care.2 '
But how far can or should managed care go in cutting out so-
called health care "overutilization"? This question leads to the
second managed care cost-containment strategy: utilization re-
view. While capitation payments to physicians act as a carrot to
encourage efficient health care consumption decisions, utiliza-
tion review provides the stick.22 Through case managers, man-
aged care companies attempt to oversee health care
consumption decisions to make sure that they conform with
some sort of utilization standard or protocol that has been
adopted by the company. When they do not, punitive measuies
against the physician may be inflicted (for example, financial
penalties, termination from the provider panel).
Health care intervention conceivably falls along a complicated
continuum of risks and benefits that could be characterized as
follows:
1. Positively harmful care (negligent intervention or
malpractice);
2. Wasteful care (when the cost of care significantly outweighs
its benefits; futile care);
20. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or
Worse Quality of Care?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 7; Walter A. Zelman,
Consumer Protection in Managed Care: Finding the Balance, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan.-
Feb. 1997, at 158, 159.
21. See CHARLES M. JACOBS ET AL., MEASURING THE QUALITY OF PATIENT
CARE: THE RATIONALE FOR OUTCOME AUDIT (1976).
22. See William S. Andereck, Balancing the Budget at the Bedside, HEALTHCARE
FORUM J., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 32, 34.
1998]
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3. Marginally wasteful care (when the cost of care marginally
outweighs its benefits);
4. Break-even care (when the costs and benefits of care are
equal);
5. Marginally useful care (when the benefits of care marginally
outweigh its costs); and
6. Positively indicated care (when the benefits of care clearly
outweigh the costs; e.g., life-saving emergency medical
treatment).
Where a particular intervention falls on this continuum for a
particular patient may depend upon many factors, such as the
patient's condition (including severity of illness and any co-mor-
bidity), the effectiveness of the intervention for this particular
patient, the likely outcome for the patient following the inter-
vention, and the cost of the intervention. Even with this infor-
mation, the cost-benefit calculation cannot take place without
an objective or uncontested valuation system that allows a pa-
tient, a payor, and a provider to agree on whether benefits out-
weigh costs. Benefits and costs are not simply matters of dollars
and cents. They involve issues such as the quality of life of the
patient and the social costs of providing care to some patients at
the expense of others.
HMOs in the real world, however, do not appear to be
bogged down by the obstacles to the identification and max-
imization of health care efficiency. The HMOs' utilization pro-
tocols allow them to make allocation decisions and physicians
are encouraged, financially and otherwise, to comply with the
protocols and to impose their own bedside rationing. As al-
ready mentioned, wherever and however HMOs draw the line
on coverage, they seem to be placing their members at no
greater health risk. It remains to be seen, however, as managed
care competition matures, whether the drive to reduce cost will
cause HMOs to offer so little care that patients are at greater
health risk than they were under the fee-for-service payment
system. If we reach this point, we will also have to decide
whether this added health risk is socially acceptable to patients,
purchasers, providers, and policy makers.
The two poles of the continuum, clearly harmful and clearly
helpful care, do not raise a conflict. No one thinks that our
health care financing system should fund care that is negligent
or futile. Nor does anyone seek to deny coverage for care where
benefits clearly and substantially outweigh costs, such as in the
[Vol. 7
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case of a true medical emergency. The battle line, however,
seems to be drawn over whether any care of marginal utility
should be provided to a patient if the costs (in the payor's view)
outweigh the benefits. Physicians seem to be comfortable with
denying care that is either futile or highly unlikely to yield re-
sults when the costs to the patient outweigh the benefits to the
patient. The physicians may not, however, wish to consider the
insurer's costs in this analysis.
The managed care company, by contrast, insists that its costs
be considered through the implementation of incentive pay-
ments to the physician and utilization protocols. It is not clear
where HMOs typically draw the line on when to cut off treat-
ment; however, they may often draw the line well below the pa-
tient's cut-off point. The move down the continuum from futile
care toward marginally useful care is where the egalitarian-utili-
tarian conflict plays out. A physician, governed by the patient-
centered ethos, will want to provide any care that may be bene-
ficial to the patient, regardless of its social costs. The efficiency-
driven HMO, however, may be willing to sacrifice one patient's
benefit for the advantage of other enrollees.
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL EXTREMES
A. Managed Care's Utilitarianism
Utilitarians evaluate actions and policies by their potential for
maximizing benefits over costs. Utilitarians give moral primacy
to ideas such as the common good or the greatest good for the
greatest number. 23 Utilitarianism is outcome-oriented, measur-
ing the morality of an act by its empirical results rather than by
any theoretical claims.24 Utilitarianism fits in nicely with man-
aged care's medical skepticism, in that care managers tend to
avoid providing care that is not recognized as effective. In order
for an HMO to authorize certain coverage, the HMO needs to
believe that the proposed care is proven or likely to improve the
patient's condition significantly.
To the extent that health care can cure disease, alleviate pain
and suffering, and prolong life, it is obviously beneficial. Con-
23. See Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Health Care Delivery: Computers and Distrib-
utive Justice, in ETHICS AND HEALTH POLICY 99, 103 (Robert M. Veatch & Roy Bran-
son eds., 1976); Gene Outka, Social Justice and Equal Access to Health Care, in
ETHICS AND HEALTH POLICY 79, 85 (Robert M. Veatch & Roy Branson eds., 1976).
24. See CHARLES DOUGHERTY, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: REALITIES, RIGHTS,
AND REFORMS 35-37 (1998).
1998]
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versely, the cost of illness, disability, and death has great adverse
consequences, not only for the individual, but also for the indi-
vidual's friends and loved ones and society at large, due in part
to the loss of the person's productivity (not to mention the con-
tinued payment of health insurance premiums). However, ad-
dressing individual instances of health care allocation is not the
true focus of managed care's utilitarianism.
Instead, managed care seeks to maximize the largest aggre-
gate utility through the establishment of general rules and poli-
2-5cies. This concept is known as "rule utilitarianism." The
"decent minimum" level of coverage for the rule utilitarian is
the minimum cost-effectiveness that any treatment must yield to
be included in the benefit package. Individual coverage deci-
sions are governed by the enrollee's contractual promise to
abide by the HMO's rule or policy that addresses the requested
care, regardless of its utility to the particular patient, in return
for paying a lower premium, compared to indemnity coverage.
HMO enrollees cannot complain later, when they become sick,
that they lack full indemnity coverage. They are entitled to only
the type and level of care for which they contracted. Otherwise,
the entire system of contracting for health care coverage would
become meaningless. Rule utilitarianism strives for maximum
benefit in the aggregate over the long run.26 One such rule is
the enforceability of contracts.
On the positive side, rule utilitarianism provides a clear pol-
icy-making framework for confronting the scarcity of medical
resources. 27 Costs and benefits of various coverage decisions
need to be quantified. The overall impact of the approach must
be assessed for the entire covered population. How many "cov-
ered lives '28 will be affected? How? For how long? At what
cost? For what outcomes? If we provide the care to X, what
impact will it have on Y? Managed care deals with health care
resource allocation in the context of its covered community.
These difficult and potentially emotional issues are diffused by
the utilitarian's detached, aggregated, and empirical approach to
the problem.29 In addition, by allocating health care resources
25. See id. at 37-41.
26. See id. at 37.
27. See id. at 38.
28. The term "covered lives" refers to the number of patients enrolled in a partic-
ular plan.
29. See DOUGHERTY, supra note 24, at 38-39.
[Vol. 7
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more efficiently, more people could have increased access to
care and, on average, achieve better outcomes and health status.
On the negative side, the empirical challenge of quantifying
aggregate utility for the entire covered population is itself mor-
ally offensive when the coverage rules "de-value" or sacrifice
certain lives (for example, the elderly, the chronically ill, and the
disabled). General rules that tend to benefit most of the insured
most of the time may be untenable for people who seek cover-
age as individuals in the short run.30 As Gene Outka states,
"Once we have witnessed tangible suffering, we cannot just re-
turn with ease to public policies aimed at statistical patients. 31
Yet the choice of sacrificing one for the many may be a false
choice. Joseph Fletcher, a utilitarian, has made the point that
the choice is not one of good over evil or benefit over cost.32
Rather, the choice is between saving this one at the expense of
many other "ones. ' 33 As he states, "The 'greatest number' is
not an abstraction; it is the sum of real, particular and personal
individuals. '34 Thus, the health care allocation dilemma forces
choices between competing goods, not choices between good
and evil or right and wrong.35 Identifying this dilemma, how-
ever, does not solve it. Utilitarianism remains an empty ration-
alization for anyone who must actually confront and suffer as a
result of such choices.
We also lack an agreed-upon calculus for identifying the value
of a particular coverage rule.36 Is well-baby care more valuable
than well-elder care? What sort of empirical data can even be-
gin to address such a choice? Thus, despite the surface appeal of
providing a detached empirical framework for making thought-
ful health care allocation decisions, managed care's utilitarian-
ism fails to meet such expectations. It fails because it is based
upon the false premise that such an analysis is objectively possi-
ble, and because it serves only to shield us from having to con-
front the tragic choice of saving one life instead of another.
30. See id. at 40.
31. Outka, supra note 23, at 96.
32. See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 107.
33. See Howard Brody & Carolyn M. Clancy, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273
JAMA 338, 338-39 (1995).
34. Fletcher, supra note 23, at 107.
35. See id.
36. See DOUGHERTY, supra note 24, at 39.
1998]
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B. The Patient's Egalitarianism
For the egalitarian, a person's moral dignity is based upon
one's incalculable intrinsic worth.37 Because of their intrinsic
value, comparing or ranking patients and their medical needs is
inappropriate. 38 Denying health care because one is weak, poor,
old, foolish, or otherwise of less use to some larger community is
never merited. 39 For egalitarians, the only proper ground for
distributing health care is illness.4 ° The physician is interested in
achieving substantive egalitarianism in that the physician wishes
to provide the amount of health care required to achieve a par-
ticular outcome. Rich or poor, all patients with the same disease
get the same complete treatment. In making treatment deci-
sions, a purely egalitarian physician does not consider the needs
of other patients or the cost of care.41
Naturally, this approach to the allocation of scarce health care
resources is not without flaws. The patient's health care needs
and desires do not exist in a vacuum. The payor, relying on the
patient's contractual promise to abide by the plan's coverage
limits, and the other policyholders and patients are also part of
the landscape. The micro-allocation decision at the bedside of a
particular patient may have a profound and adverse impact on
the rest of the parties that have some interest regarding the allo-
cation of scarce medical resources. Joseph Fletcher argues that
the "ancient one-to-one medical ethic is too simple, and it there-
fore falsifies ethical problems. '42 In Fletcher's utilitarian view,
"sophisticated discussion of the problem of social justice and the
delivery of health care is rich with such terms as priorities, rela-
tive claims, triage, value judgment, . . . cost-benefit balance,
[and] tradeoff. . .. " In other words, patients who make the
egalitarian claim that cost is not a relevant health care consider-
ation are either deluded or deluding.
Even within the physician-patient relationship, the physician's
treatment analysis rests to some degree on some sort of utilita-
rian cost-benefit analysis in selecting and recommending an ap-
37. See id. at 52.
38. See id. at 53.
39. See id. at 53.
40. See Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in Justice and Equity 127 (Bedau
H. Engelwood ed. 1971).
41. See Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Re-
form, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 70 (1993).
42. Fletcher, supra note 23, at 104.
43. Id.
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proach to that patient." Informed consent law generally
requires the physician to present the patient with treatment op-
tions along with their risks (i.e., costs) and benefits. Even doing
nothing is not risk-free or without cost. There is no escaping
such an analysis, so why not factor in the cost to the HMO or
society? Moreover, the decision to pull out all the stops for one
patient is an act that robs not only the managed care entity, but
it also robs other patients. Once the scarcity of health care re-
sources is acknowledged, the impact on others in the affected
community should not be ignored. Certainly, no one would ac-
cept (except perhaps the benefitted patient and the physician)
the allocation of an entire HMO's resources on one patient to
prevent that patient's death for three months. Yet, by what
principle can the egalitarian refuse this patient without relying
upon some sort of utilitarian analysis?
Another weakness of egalitarianism rests on our intuitive
sense that we are not all equal. Some people may believe that
they are more entitled to health care than others. People who
engage in a lifetime of high-risk behavior might not have the
same moral claim to care as someone who lives conservatively.
This strong sense of individuality is denied by egalitarianism. If
everyone is intrinsically equal, no one is special. Yet, each of us
and our loved ones believe deeply that we are. Egalitarianism
flies in the face of some of our most deeply held views about
ourselves and others.
III. THE HEALTH-PLANNING MANDATE ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION PROPOSAL
One may safely conclude that egalitarianism and utilitarian-
ism are irreconcilable. Nevertheless, decisions about health care
mandates persist. The challenge is to devise a process that al-
lows the egalitarian and utilitarian merits of a particular pro-
posed benefit to be debated openly and thoroughly in a more
systematic, thoughtful, and empirical way. Until we adopt an
approach that systematizes the way legislators address certain
questions about mandated health care benefits and protects leg-
islators from the emotional assaults likely to occur under the
current system, piecemeal proposals will likely flourish. The ad
hoc approach is not conducive to the development of a sound,
cohesive health care system.
44. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Ethical Issues in
Managed Care, 273 JAMA 332 (1995).
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Some states already have begun to experiment with proposals
that seek to avoid the ad hoc approach to regulating access to
health care. For example, rather than addressing minimum
length-of-stay issues on a procedure-by-procedure or condition-
by-condition basis, a proposal adopted in Connecticut provides
the following approach:
1. Physicians may ask managed care companies for permission
to exceed the plan's recommended length of stay.
2. The plan's medical director must respond to the faxed re-
quest within three hours or the extended stay request is
deemed to be granted.
3. If the medical director denies the request within the allotted
time, the doctor and the hospital are immune from liability
for any adverse outcomes associated with the premature
discharge.
4. The managed care company bears sole responsibility and li-
ability for adverse outcomes.
5. The physician and patient are entitled to an appeal process
before an outside peer review organization to evaluate the
denial of the extended length of stay.45
This approach allows health plans, patients, and physicians to
reach length-of-stay decisions on a case-by-case basis without in-
volving the legislature or a government agency. The added lia-
bility exposure to the health plan for the denial of extended stay
requests gives patients and physicians additional leverage to get
such requests approved.
However, medical malpractice liability may be an empty
threat against managed care abuse for at least two reasons.
First, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") 46 may preempt medical malpractice claims for the
vast majority of employees receiving their health care coverage
from employers with ERISA plans. 47 Second, to sustain a claim,
a patient must suffer a significant injury caused by the denial of
an extended stay request. In addition to having a theoretical
claim, patients need to incur sufficient harm to make the case
45. See An Act Concerning Managed Care, H.B. 6883, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997).
Items 3 and 4 were not included in the final enactment. See 1997 Conn. Acts 99 (Reg.
Sess.).
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
47. ERISA is a comprehensive federal employee benefits law which contains a
broad preemption provision stating that ERISA "shall supercede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter related to any employee benefit plan." Id.
§ 1144(a).
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financially attractive to attorneys. To the extent such denials are
not sufficiently harmful to the patient, litigation is unlikely. Is-
sues of causation further chill the zeal of even the most ardent
malpractice attorneys. However, the worst aspect of this ap-
proach is its reactionary feature. Patients are generally more
interested in obtaining adequate care through an extended stay
than a medical malpractice claim. Damages are hardly an ade-
quate substitute for a good health care outcome.
Minnesota, on the other hand, is considering a bill that would
create a cost-benefit review process for health care mandates.48
Under this bill, the state directors of health, commerce, human
service, and employee relations would assess proposed health
care benefit mandates and their social and financial costs prior
to their enactment. Once a mandate is proposed, it would be
assessed, and the assessors may recommend that the problem
addressed by the mandate be resolved without legislation. Be-
cause such assessments would be time consuming, it is likely that
a proposal made in one legislative session would not be acted
upon until the following session.
This proposal attempts to systematize the way health care
mandates are legislated, but this government-run, cost-benefit
analysis needs to be structured in a way that helps minimize the
possibility of abuse. Accordingly, legislatures in states with a
health-planning agency should redirect that agency's energies to
the assessment of health care mandates, governed by statutory
provisions regarding its mission, membership, and processes.
A. The Commission's Mission
One of the global messages from the demise of President
Clinton's health care plan and the hope placed upon managed
care to strike the proper cost-benefit balance in health care is
that this society, for the moment and the foreseeable future, be-
lieves that free market forces should address our health-con-
sumption decisions. In the debate over choosing between
imperfect market forces and imperfect regulation, the market
won. This victory, of course, does not prove that the market
approach is absolutely and always superior to a "command and
control" regulatory approach, or that markets need not be regu-
lated. Rather, the message from the fall of "Clintoncare" and
the rise of managed care is that we are willing to favor a market
48. See Health Care Consumer Protection and Assistance, S.B. 320, 80th Legis.
Sess. (Minn. 1997).
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approach to distributing health care. Whether the current de-
bate over managed care regulation is evidence that the tide has
shifted against market favoritism remains to be seen. For now,
however, our collective bias still favors a market approach to
health care coverage over government-mandated coverage.
Accordingly, the mission of a health-planning mandate assess-
ment commission should be to presume that the free market
provides the best vehicle for resolving the many complex and
idiosyncratic tensions and trade-offs between containing health
care costs and providing access to care. The primary purpose of
commission review is to determine if the market has failed or is
likely to fail in providing the coverage that is in the best interest
of the insured.49 Some of the environmental factors conducive
to an insurance market that is responsive to the needs of the
insured include the following:
1. That the insured have a strong incentive to move to health
plans offering the proposed health care mandate;
2. That health plans in the market are free to offer the pro-
posed benefit; and
3. That new health plans willing to offer the proposed benefit
may freely enter the market to meet the demand for this
benefit. °
In his defense of a free-market focus for the traditional CON
health-planning process, Clark Havighurst suggests: "If competi-
tive conditions are truly healthy, with barriers to entry and inno-
vation low, the market could be deemed to reflect consumer
preferences well enough to validate the cost-containment mech-
anisms in place as optimal for consumers' needs." 5'
Applying this logic to the current proposal, if the market is
sufficiently responsive to consumer concerns, the lack of a pro-
posed mandate being offered by some plans should not justify
legislative action. If, however, no plan is likely to offer a man-
date that has widespread consumer support, such market failure
may warrant a legislated coverage mandate. Thus, as a thresh-
old matter, the commission needs to assess whether there is a
market failure that warrants further analysis of the proposed
mandate.
49. See generally, CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY 257 (1982).
50. See id.; see also DOUGHERTY, supra note 16, at 151.
51. HAVIGHURST, supra note 49, at 300.
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In addition to studying whether competitive market condi-
tions are suspect or inferior, the commission needs to consider
the following factors in its deliberations.
1. Societal Factors:
1. The extent to which the proposed mandate is needed by the
affected community;
2. Current availability and utilization of the proposed coverage
within the affected community;
3. The extent to which insurance coverage for the proposed
benefit already exists, or if no such coverage exists, the ex-
tent to which this lack of coverage results in inadequate
health care or financial hardship for the affected
community;
4. The demand for the proposed benefit from the public and
the source and extent of opposition to mandating the
benefit;
5. All relevant findings bearing on the social impact of the ab-
sence of the proposed benefit;
6. The extent to which similar mandated benefits in other
states have affected the quality, cost and availability of the
proposed service mandate.
2. Financial Factors:
1. The extent to which the proposed benefit would increase or
decrease the cost treatment or service;
2. The extent to which similar mandated benefits in other
states have affected charges and payments for services;
3. The impact of the proposed benefit on the administrative
expenses of health care insurers;
4. The impact of the proposed benefit on the cost of benefits to
purchasers;
5. The impact of the proposed benefit on the total cost of
health care within the state;
6. The extent to which employers already provide the benefit
to their employees, and the cost and benefit of that
provision;
7. The impact of the proposed mandate, if enacted, on other
benefits typically provided by insurers.
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3. Medical Factors:
1. The extent to which the proposed benefit would increase the
appropriate use of a treatment or service;
2. The extent to which outcome research suggests that the
mandate improves health care quality or reduces health care
costs;
3. The extent to which the health care delivery system can sup-
ply the benefit throughout the community.
Obviously, these factors are not exhaustive of all that a partic-
ular state may wish to explore to reach sound policy decisions
regarding health care mandates. These factors are merely sug-
gestions for limiting the debate to a more rational consideration
of the issue. Hysteria, of course, cannot always be eliminated,
but at least an approach that is structured to look at empirical
data regarding a proposed mandate should help inform the judg-
ment of the commission members and perhaps offset some of
the emotional heat with empirical light.
B. The Commission's Membership
The commission's membership should have sufficient repre-
sentation from payors, such as the business community; provid-
ers, including hospitals, physicians, insurers, and HMAS; and
consumer advocates. The members of the commission must rep-
resent a broad cross-section of the community, possess exper-
tise, and maintain varying perspectives so that the commission
has the ability to speak authoritatively on these issues. Commis-
sion membership will be one of the keys to obtaining a well-
rounded, thoughtful perspective on a proposed health care
mandate.
C. The Commission's Jurisdiction
Not all legislative proposals regulating managed care practices
should be referred to this commission. The commission's main
contribution to the legislative process is its expert and thorough
analysis of the cost-benefit effects of a proposed health care cov-
erage mandate. The combination of medical, financial, and so-
cial consequences that may flow from such proposals are so
complex and highly charged that commission review would be
beneficial to a legislator's consideration of the proposal. By
contrast, bills involving such matters as enrollee grievance pro-
cedures, gag clauses, managed care malpractice liability, and
provider due process rights, while complex in their own way,
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raise neither the medical complexity nor the emotion that at-
tends a mandated coverage proposal. The commission's special
expertise in the area of health care economics would not signifi-
cantly improve a legislator's ability to assess the merits of non-
mandate managed care reform proposals. Thus, the commis-
sion's jurisdiction should be limited to bills that only seek to de-
fine the minimum benefit coverage package of managed care
plans.
D. The Commission's Process
Under this proposal, supporters of health care mandates
should be required to justify the proposed mandates with
whatever arguments, claims, and data are available. In other
words, the burden of proof regarding the mandate will rest with
its proponent. The difficulty with this approach is that certain
mandate proponents may not have the time or the data to satisfy
all of the criteria in any given case, so that as a practical matter,
their proposals would be barred. Also, for some proposals, no
data are available (for example., cost-benefit analysis of length-
of-stays for mastectomies), and added time might not allow pro-
ponents to generate or find such data. In other cases, hard data
may suggest that the proposal is unnecessary (for example, ma-
ternity length-of-stay mandates), but the issue is so politically
sensitive that it still may be recommended by the commission.
In light of all of these complex and unpredictable contingencies
that present themselves with respect to proposed health care
mandates, the assessment criteria that define the commission's
mission should serve as mandate assessment guidelines, not pre-
requisites. In this way, the mandate proponents and the com-
missioners could consult the guidelines on a case-by-case basis
and apply each guideline to the extent it is feasible to do so.
Although lack of supporting evidence under each of the assess-
ment guidelines should not automatically disqualify a proposal,
a proponent failing to support a proposal with evidence under
all of the guidelines should be required to explain such failure to
the commission.
Although this process will likely raise the cost of advocating
for a particular mandate, and thus may reduce the number of
proposals being offered or recommended, it provides a level of
deliberation that is currently missing. To offset some of the in-
herent bias against recommending mandates, procedural rules
should be established for the commission so that a mandate pro-
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ponent need only make a prima facie or credible showing to
convince a simple majority of the commissioners that the propo-
sal has merit. Once the commission makes this finding, the bur-
den of persuasion would shift to the mandate's opponents to
convince a super-majority, for instance, two-thirds of the com-
missioners, that the proposal lacks merit. These burden-shifting
and majority vote requirements could be employed to offset the
inherent obstacles within this process to support proposed
health care mandates.
E. In Defense of the Proposal
This proposal has merit for at least four reasons. First, by re-
directing its capital-focused expertise to service mandates, the
commission can investigate and debate the alleged abusive man-
aged care practice of underserving enrollees in a forum designed
to look at the health care system as a whole.
Second, the addition of commission review into the legislative
process also will allow emotions surrounding the event-precip-
itating the "there ought to be a law" sentiment of the public,
media, and politicians-to dissipate. Public and media attention
to issues in general is short-lived, but mandate legislation virtu-
ally lasts forever. By subjecting proposed mandates to a more
reasoned and, therefore, time-consuming process, their need can
be assessed without the glare and heat of a single, tragic event
supposedly signaling a major crisis in the health care delivery
system. As Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit recognized
twenty years ago in their classic book, Tragic Choices, the pas-
sage of time
permits the description of the actors involved in abstract terms
and thereby encourages the perception of the tragic choice in
theoretical terms; and it allows criticism of past decisions with-
out indicting the present decision making. The scholarly com-
mentary on tragic choices amply documents the vast difference
it makes to society whether lives are confronted as statistical
or real.52
In short, slowing down the process allows reason to overtake
emotion.
Third, this added review in the mandate-enactment process
will give the corrective measures of the marketplace a chance to
address and eliminate the problem without the need for legisla-
tion. Although many states have enacted "drive-through" legis-
52. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICEs 68 (1978).
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lation, health plans easily could have gained a marketing
advantage by distinguishing themselves from plans that failed to
provide a sufficient length-of-stay for newborns and their
mothers. If the public viewed such coverage as a sign of a better
health plan, the plans providing inadequate coverage would lose
market share. Health-planners would be required to assess
whether the market has or will adequately address a particular
coverage dispute before recommending more drastic legislative
action.
Lastly, the commission's decisions are not final; they are only
studied recommendations, possibly with dissenting views, to the
legislators that created the commission. Legislators are free to
accept or reject the views of the commission regarding a pro-
posed benefit mandate if and when it comes to a vote. The com-
mission does not eliminate political accountability. It simply
affords all of the effected parties time to thoroughly assess a
proposed health care coverage mandate and to determine if the
immediate appeal of the proposal is exaggerated. If the case for
the proposal is compelling after this process is completed, legis-
lators can be more confident that their vote in favor of the pro-
posal is right.
Although the commission will not yield a perfectly well-bal-
anced or ideal minimum health care benefits package, it offers
advantages that our current legislative process lacks. No hu-
manly created entity will be entirely free of political or philo-
sophical bias. Nor will it be free of errors in judgment or
perception regarding the claims made before it. The public pol-
icy challenge, however, is not to choose between perfect compe-
tition and perfect regulation. The challenge is to create
sufficient tension between imperfect competition and imperfect
regulation so that the excesses of either force do not always con-
trol how health care is provided. This approach does not guar-
antee that poorly designed mandates will be prohibited or that
good ones will become law. However, it would be a vast im-
provement over the ad hoc approach most states and Congress
have adopted for defining a minimum health care benefits
package.
F. Why Health-Planning Agencies?
State health-planning agencies have been struggling with is-
sues such as the need for health care facilities, equipment, and
1998]
21
Nodzenski: Regulating Managed Care Coverage: A New Direction for Health-Plan
Published by LAW eCommons, 1998
Annals of Health Law
services since the 1970s.53 The complex need analysis under
which health-planning agencies determine whether there is a
"need" for facilities, equipment, or services demonstrates these
agencies ability to determine the "need" for a proposed health
care mandate.5 4 Health-planning agencies have extensive expe-
rience and expertise in assessing the needs of the health care
delivery system, as evidenced by their comprehensive substan-
tive regulatory provisions, governing everything from the need
for more magnetic resonance imaging equipment to non-hospi-
tal based ambulatory surgery. The breadth and depth of the
analysis undertaken by these agencies makes them perhaps the
only state agency capable of providing the sort of needs analysis
that health care mandate proposals deserve.
Thirty-seven states still have health-planning agencies. As
managed care cost-containment pressures diminish the role of
health-planning with respect to capital and service intensity on
the provider side, these agencies can move naturally to a needs
assessment of health care coverage proposals on the payor side.
IV. CONCLUSION
As patients, we expect our physician to be devoted entirely to
our well-being, even at the expense of others. As insureds, we
expect our HMO to provide the most health care at the lowest
premium. This Article illustrates that neither the egalitarian nor
the utilitarian perspective takes us where we want to go as pa-
tients and premium payors. We are as schizophrenic as our
health care system. Given our pluralistic attitudes about man-
aged care coverage questions, health-planners should favor a
free-market allocation of managed care services subject to a
market-failure analysis. Under this approach, legislators could
assess proposed health care mandates outside of the politically
charged, emotionally draining debate that currently takes place.
It imposes a more analytical health-planning approach. It re-
quires mandate proponents to appear before an independent
health-planning mandate assessment commission and overcome
the presumption against legislating health care benefits by offer-
ing arguments based upon data, health policy, individual rights,
53. See, e.g., Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3960/1-19
(West 1996) (codifying Pub. Act 78-1156, effective Aug. 27, 1974).
54. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 1100 (1991).
55. See id.
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moral philosophy, economics, or whatever compelling reasons
they may have for proposing a particular mandate.
The ability to debate mandated health care benefits through
traditional legislative processes is deficient, and a new approach
should be adopted. Addressing these issues in the context of a
widely representative health-planning commission applying a
defined set of factors in its deliberations would introduce more
reason and reflection into the way we mandate minimum health
care benefits within our health care system.
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